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Abstract
Watchdog timers are devices that are commonly used to monitor the health
of safety-critical hardware and software systems. Their primary function is to
raise an alarm if the monitored systems fail to emit periodic “heartbeats” that
signal their well-being. In this paper we design and verify a molecular watchdog
timer for monitoring the health of programmed molecular nanosystems. This
raises new challenges because our molecular watchdog timer and the system that
it monitors both operate in the probabilistic environment of chemical kinetics,
where many failures are certain to occur and it is especially hard to detect the
absence of a signal.
Our molecular watchdog timer is the result of an incremental design process
that uses goal-oriented requirements engineering, simulation, stochastic analysis,
and software verification tools. We demonstrate the molecular watchdog’s
functionality by having it monitor a molecular oscillator. Both the molecular
watchdog timer and the oscillator are implemented as chemical reaction networks,
which are the current programming language of choice for many molecular
programming applications.
1 Introduction
Molecular programming uses the information processing inherent in chemistry, espe-
cially the chemistry of DNA and other biomolecules, to engineer useful nanoscale
systems. Molecular programming applications including diagnostic biosensors, medi-
cal therapeutics, molecular robots and bio-compatible materials already exist in the
laboratory and are poised to have a major impact on society.
This paper proposes the design of verifiable safety mechanisms for molecular
programming applications. This is an important and timely objective because many
of the planned future uses of molecular programmed systems are safety-critical,
such as biosensors to detect pollutants in water or drug therapeutics to deliver
customized medicine only to the locations in the body where disease has been detected
[63, 65, 18, 39]. During the rapid expansion of the field of molecular programming,
∗This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants #1247051 and
#1545028.
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basic research has been rightly focused on normal operation (systems doing what
they should). However, as the field progresses to development and deployment, it
will also need to focus on avoiding hazards (systems not doing what they shouldn’t).
Designing and formally verifying safety mechanisms for programmable control of
molecular systems now will help enable this future focus on safety [22].
In many safety-critical systems, the failure of a monitored system can be dangerous
if it goes undetected. A standard remedy is to introduce a software watchdog timer, a
safety mechanism whose responsibility is to monitor for the occurrence of the failure
and to raise an alarm that can trigger recovery action if a failure occurs [29, 38]. For
example, on the Voyager spacecraft, a heartbeat was sent every two seconds from
the attitude control computer to the command computer responsible for monitoring
its health. If the attitude control computer’s self tests failed, then no heartbeat
was generated. “After about 10 seconds passed with no heartbeats, the command
computer would issue a switch-over command to the backup processor” [44]. Correct
behavior of a watchdog timer in the context of the system it monitors is essential.
For example, the faulty integration of a watchdog timer such that it did not actually
monitor the throttle may have resulted in the failure of a major task in the Toyota
unintended acceleration accidents [30].
A watchdog timer receives a periodic heartbeat from the system that it is
monitoring. Receipt of the heartbeat resets the watchdog timer, indicating that the
monitored system is still alive. When the heartbeat signal stops, the absence of
the heartbeat causes the watchdog timer to time out and “bark’.’ Outputting this
alarm indicates that a fault has occurred in the monitored system that led to its
experiencing a service failure [4]. Watchdog timers often serve both to detect the
failures of monitored systems and to trigger their recovery, either through corrective
interventions or automated recovery actions.
Guided by the successes of software watchdog timers, we have chosen a Molecular
Watchdog Timer as our first safety mechanism for molecular programming appli-
cations. This Molecular Watchdog Timer should monitor a molecular system at
runtime, detect when the heartbeat signal from the monitored system stops, and
alarm to trigger its recovery.
The design of a Molecular Watchdog Timer is an ambitious goal. Monitoring for
the absence of an event is especially difficult in the molecular domain. Detecting the
non-occurrence of an expected event is often not yet possible for components that
execute outside the laboratory such as in vivo applications. For example, some of the
most promising planned molecular systems involve drug delivery to tumors. For such
systems, runtime monitoring and detection of faults must take place in the same
molecular environment as the programmed system itself. Additional challenges to
detecting faults at runtime in molecular programmed systems include the facts that
the behavior of molecular systems is probabilistic; the components are nanoscale, so
runtime observation is non-trivial; there are very many components so scalability is
a problem; and the components are fault-prone so any fault that can occur probably
will occur in a significant number of components.
The main contribution of this paper is the requirements specification, design,
and verification of a Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT) for molecular programming
applications. This contribution includes the following features:
1. We develop a goal-based model and formally verify the requirements for an
2
MWT using the Isabelle proof assistant [46].
2. Our MWT is designed as a chemical reaction network, a well-understood
mathematical model [1, 2] that is suitable for automatic compilation into DNA
implementations [53, 54].
3. Our MWT detects heartbeat failures at runtime and alarms accordingly.
4. Our MWT’s timing functions are carried out by stochastic delay ladders,
introduced here, that are provably reliable, both for detecting failures and for
avoiding false alarms.
5. In addition to alarming, our MWT can trigger the recovery of a monitored
system.
6. Our MWT is automatically reusable rather than having to be discarded after
a single failure.
7. Our MWT is tested with a specific monitored system, a molecular oscillator
widely used as a benchmark, modified to produce a heartbeat. Two very
different types of oscillator failure can interrupt this heartbeat.
8. Our MWT is embedded with oscillators at two widely separated ranges of size,
with end-to-end behavior verified and validated at these scales using model
checking [7, 33] and simulation, respectively.
9. These verifications demonstrate that our MWT performs correctly with the
oscillators, enabling them to recover correctly from both types of failure.
Earlier versions of our MWT were reported in [20, 21]. The version reported here
has a different architecture and improved functionality. Regarding the above list of
features, the earlier versions had goal-based models as in (1), but these were hand-
verified. The earlier versions had features (2) and (3) and rudimentary, inexplicit
versions of feature (4). The present paper’s use of the Isabelle proof assistant in
feature (1), its systematic treatment of the delay ladders in feature (4), and all
aspects of features (5) through (9) are new work. This paper describes a MWT
re-designed to be reusable, embeddable with the system it monitors, and capable of
triggering a monitored system’s recovery at runtime.
A broader contribution of the paper is to demonstrate the new use of software
engineering techniques and tools to create and verify the requirements and design
for a programmable safety mechanism, the Molecular Watchdog Timer, that will be
needed for future molecular systems such as biocompatible drug delivery nanodevices.
We have sought to make the development approach that we use general enough to
guide future molecular design work on additional safety mechanisms. We claim that
software engineering helps achieve molecular programmed systems that are safe for
use in a dynamic and only partially understood physical environment and show in
our results the benefits of a software engineering approach to creating new molecular
systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the goal-oriented
requirements analysis and machine-checked refinement proofs for the Molecular
Watchdog Timer. Section 3 presents the chemical reaction network design models
3
to achieve these capabilities. Section 4 shows how simulation, probabilistic model
checking and mathematical proofs are used to validate and verify the design. Section 5
describes related work, and Section 6 gives concluding remarks.
2 Requirements
In this section we describe a requirements engineering process for programmed
molecular systems and use it to develop the requirements for a runtime fault detection
device called a Molecular Watchdog Timer (MWT). We first describe informally
the high-level requirements for the new system to be built. We then describe
the iterative process by which the requirements were formally specified, analyzed,
corrected, refined, and verified as our understanding of what was needed improved.
Lastly, we discuss how the interplay between requirements and design contributed
to the incremental improvement of the requirements. This ongoing process made
the requirements significantly more complete, accurate and realistic (i.e., feasible to
implement in DNA).
Despite the difficulty of “getting the requirements right” for a new molecular
device, our use of requirements engineering techniques in molecular programming is
novel. We show how engaging in goal-oriented requirements engineering can benefit
the design of programmed molecular systems, especially by finding and solving
problems early in development.
Figure 1 shows a context diagram [60] for the MWT. The Monitored System
sends a regular signal (labeled “Heartbeat”) to the MWT. The MWT processes this
signal and outputs an Alarm to an external observer or system if the signal has
stopped.
MWT
Heartbeat Alarm
Monitored
System
Figure 1: Context Diagram
2.1 Goal modeling
We used a goal-oriented requirements engineering approach that we based on van
Lamsweerde’s KAOS [60] and introduced in [40, 41] to specify and analyze the MWT
system goals. Goal-oriented techniques support systematic and incremental refine-
ment from informal descriptions to formal specification of properties for simulation
and model checking.
We first performed goal modeling to understand what was needed to achieve a
MWT. A goal model is an AND/OR graph in which the top-level node describes
the high-level functional requirement of the system-to-be and the leaf nodes are the
subgoals whose collective satisfaction implies satisfaction of the top-level goal. The
goals are specified as goals to ACHIEVE, MAINTAIN, or AVOID various conditions in
view of the domain properties (such as physical laws governing molecular interactions).
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ACHIEVE
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Threshold for
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AVOID
Alarm until first
Threshold
ACHIEVE
Alarm iff no HB
provided in t
time
Figure 2: Goal Model
An AND node is satisfied provided that its children nodes are satisfied. An OR node
shows alternative refinements of a node. Our goal model’s nodes are all AND nodes.
The AND/OR refinement of high-level goals and the graphical presentation of the
results is sufficiently intuitive to be useful in our discussions with molecular biologists.
It also allows both top-down and bottom-up development of the hierarchical tree
as understanding improves. The logical underpinnings of KAOS support formal
analysis and clean traceability between the textual descriptions of the goals and the
formal specification of the goal model.
Our high-level goal is that at runtime the MWT shall issue an alarm if and
only if the monitored system does not provide a heartbeat within a specified time.
Figure 2 shows the goal model for the MWT. The top-level goal, Achieve[Alarm iff
no Heartbeat provided within t time] describes the intent of the system-to-be. That
goal is AND-refined into two subgoals, such that it can be satisfied if both of the
two second-level goals are met. The subgoals are further refined until each leaf goal
can be assigned to an agent (discussed in Sect. 3). An agent is a system component
with responsibility for satisfying the goal(s) assigned to it [60].
The MWT’s client can use the alarm signal output by the MWT either as an
externally observable alarm that notifies the client when the heartbeat stops or as a
recovery trigger prompting the initiation of some recovery action when the heartbeat
stops. The first usage scenario is intended for scientific observations where the alarm
signal might, for example, be a fluorescent molecule visible to a human technician.
The second scenario is useful when the MWT is monitoring an adjacent molecular
system that is capable of autonomous recovery and is a focus of this work.
2.2 Environmental assumptions
Environmental assumptions are statements about the system’s operational context
that are accepted as true by the developers [59]. The proposed MWT will be made
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of DNA strands and will operate, both literally and figuratively, in a fluid, molecular
environment. For satisfaction of the subgoals to imply that the parent goal is satisfied,
we must make certain assumptions about the operational environment. For example,
we assume that the chemical solution in which the MWT operates is well mixed.
Other environmental assumptions needed to prove the satisfiability of the top-level
goal are that the heartbeat species, H, is intrinsically ephemeral, meaning that it
will not persist and will decay over time; that the number of H molecules in the
heartbeat pulse is in a certain range; and that no molecules in the environment other
than the heartbeats interact with the MWT.
If these environmental assumptions are false or cease to be true, the validity of
the solution may be at risk. We will see below how the process of formalizing the leaf
goals, proving that the leaf goals implied the top-level goal and verifying the design
forced us to revisit and revise several of our original environmental assumptions.
2.3 Goal formalization
For every goal we needed both a natural language description and a formal spec-
ification. We specified the goals in continuous stochastic logic (CSL) [5] because
of its availability in the model checking tool that we use and because it handles
the continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs) [1, 2] that form the semantics of our
chemical reaction networks (described in Section 3). Formally specifying the goals
and assumptions enabled us to prove that the satisfaction of the lower-level goals,
together with the stated assumptions, implies the satisfaction of the higher-level
goals.
The complete CSL specifications for the goal model appear in the table in the
Appendix. For each node in the goal model, the table there shows (1) the name of
the node, (2) the formal specification of the node in CSL, and (3) the agent assigned
responsibility for each leaf goal. The goals are ordered breadth first following Figure 2.
As an example, the leaf goal Achieve[Alarm if Threshold for some time] has the CSL
specification P≥1 [ThH =⇒ P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)] and is assigned to
the Threshold Filter as described in Section 3.
We proved that the goals, together with the specified environmental assumptions
and facts and parameter values in their specified ranges, satisfy the top-level goal.
This proof was carried out manually and iteratively during the development of the
goal model.
2.4 Obstacle analysis
The MWT must work safely and with high reliability to detect and recover from
faults in the molecular applications for which it is intended, such as bio-sensing and
medical therapeutics. A major challenge in developing the MWT was determining
accurately the requirements for a feasible system that could operate in the molecular
environment. To do this we needed to analyze whether the stated goals could be
realistically satisfied in this stochastic and dynamic setting.
To investigate feasibility, we used KAOS’s obstacle analysis extensively [61, 60, 11].
An obstacle to a goal is a precondition for that goal’s non-satisfaction [60]. Given a
goal model in which A and B are the AND subgoals of parent goal C, an obstacle
for C is a state of affairs in which A and B are true and C is false.
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Obstacle analysis identifies ways in which the goals might fail to be satisfied (i.e.,
obstacles to satisfaction), assesses the likelihoods and impacts of the obstacles, and
investigates how to resolve them. We found in previous work on DNA nanopliers
that the early analysis of obstacles to satisfying the goals worked well in helping
find and remedy missing and unrealistic requirements in the programmed molecular
system [41].
Most of the obstacles for the MWT were subtle and found manually while proving
that subgoals satisfied their parent goal. The process of proving the satisfiability of
the formal CSL goals repeatedly revealed both additional cases and uncertainties
that could be introduced by the stochastic behavior. Gaps and errors in the goal
model often were due to the non-deterministic, asynchronous nature of reactions,
to the very large number of molecular agents operating in parallel, and to the
physical environment in which the MWT operates. Model-based mathematical
analysis, simulation with the MATLAB extension, SimBiology, and probabilistic
model-checking with PRISM [32], as described below, helped us assess the likelihood
and impact of candidate obstacles.
Representative examples of obstacles we found in the early version of the MWT
were previously reported in [20]. These include:
Incorrect agent. We initially assigned a binary counting device introduced in [27]
to be the clock agent responsible for detecting the absence of a heartbeat. However,
simulation in SimBiology revealed that this device did not satisfy our specification.
It was designed to work in a setting in which it is assumed that all reactions are “fast”
or “slow”, and that all fast reactions occur before all slow reactions. The stochastic
(and more realistic) model on which we work violates this assumption, allowing slow
reactions to interfere with the clock’s function. Over time the accumulation of such
violations leads to failure of the clock. To resolve this, we assigned responsibility for
that goal to a new agent in which the delay is instead achieved by a programmed
cascade of interactions.
Missing property. In refining a goal into two subgoals, we had to introduce the
domain property that it takes a positive amount of time to detect a heartbeat. This is
because the detection occurs via the chemical interaction of the heartbeat molecules
with the molecular component that detects missing heartbeats. The subgoals did
not satisfy the goal without this domain property. This obstacle was resolved by
introducing a “grace period” before heartbeat detection is required. When we initially
failed to propagate the addition of the grace period back up to the parent goal, model
checking with PRISM detected the omission, and it was corrected.
Incorrect initialization. Model checking revealed a failure mode that can occur
just after the MWT begins execution. The initial intent was that operation of the
MWT begin at time zero, i.e., when the MWT was “poured into the test tube”.
However, as specified, the MWT could violate this intent by alarming before the
monitored system had a chance to send a heartbeat. To resolve this, we added a
new CSL property to the high level goal specifying that the alarm must remain off
for a period of time after initialization. This new goal propagated through the goal
diagram to create a new leaf-goal, Achieve[Initialize to Reset], specifying that the
timer must be considered to be in a reset stage at initialization. Together with the
leaf goal Achieve[Threshold Delay if Reset], this implies that the alarm will not be
active upon initialization. We proved manually that the implication holds after the
change and confirmed using PRISM that a model with an alarm in the initial state
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satisfies the goals.
Obstacle analysis helped identify missing requirements, explore design alternatives
and find idealized environmental assumptions that had to be weakened to conform to
physical realities. The obstacle analysis process was on-going and a major contributor
to de-idealizing the goals for the MWT into requirements that were feasible for
implementation in a programmed molecular system operating in a chemical “soup”.
During the obstacle analysis we experienced extensive back-and-forth interweaving
between the requirements and the design. This iterative, incremental nature of the
modeling and analysis effort is typical of complex systems [62] and often described
in terms of “twin peaks” [47].
Related work on specifying goals in uncertain environments formalizes the required
degree of goal satisfaction, as in [37], or the required probability of goal satisfaction,
as in [10]. However, molecular systems such as the MWT may have more than
1010 individual components in solution, so failures with any significant probability
probably will occur in many individual components. The system must nevertheless
be robust enough to operate correctly (to alarm or not to alarm) with probability
approaching 1, even in the presence of some component failures. The watchdog timer
design must be one in which we have confidence that, if the system it is monitoring
fails, the MWT will detect and notify us, and that if the MWT notifies us that the
monitored system has failed, then we can trust its accuracy.
2.5 Verifying the goal model
After the goal model was stabilized, we re-proved its internal correctness (the fact that
the leaf goals imply the top-level goal) with the aid of the Isabelle proof assistant
[46, 45]. In order to maximize the use of Isabelle’s automated features and the
readability of the result, we used a hybrid of human mathematics and automated
theorem proving. Specifically, we formulated a short list of CSL lemmas that are
relatively simple (especially, not burdened with specific parameters of our design) and
capture the higher-order logical aspects of our goals that are not readily amenable
to automation. After proving these lemmas succinctly and transparently, we used
Isabelle to prove that, given these lemmas, the goal model is internally correct.
The verification of the goal model is reported completely in the Appendix.
More specifically, every CSL operator defines a state formula, so we represent
CSL operators in Isabelle as paramatrized functions from CTMC states to the set
{true, false}. For example, we can supply the P♦ operator with probability and
time parameters α and t and a component CSL formula φ; the result is the CSL
formula P≥α♦≤tφ, which can take on the values true or false at different CTMC
states.
We define rules for logical connectives in CSL using lambda expressions. For
example, given two CSL formulae φ and ψ, we define conjunction as
φ ∧ ψ = λx φ(x) ∧ ψ(x).
That is, φ ∧ ψ is a single function that returns true if both φ and ψ are true for
the given argument. In combination with the operator definitions discussed above,
logical connectives like this are suffient to encode arbitrary CSL statements and
implications in Isabelle.
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Figure 3: High-level Design
To construct a verified proof using this formalism in Isabelle, we provide a sequence
of intermediate goals that link our assumptions and other known statements with
our final goal. For each step in this proof, we provide Isabelle with assumptions
and lemmas to reference and with proof methods to apply. Isabelle’s powerful
Sledgehammer tool [43, 48] automated significant parts of this process, making it
easier to supply the correct facts and methods and take larger steps.
3 Design
The goal-oriented requirements refinement and analysis described above assigns
responsibility for achieving the MWT’s (Molecular Watchdog Timer’s) leaf goals
to two system agents: the Absence Detector component and the Threshold Filter
component, which outputs an Alarm signal. Figure 3 shows the high-level design with
these two components. The connectors among the components reflect the intended
flow of information from detection of individual heartbeats or their absences, to
determining whether the incidence of faults exceeds a programmed threshold and
issuing an alarm signal when that threshold is exceeded. We describe the mapping of
leaf goals in the goal model to the components responsible for them and the detailed
modeling of the components below.
3.1 Chemical Reaction Networks as a programming language
Our MWT design uses the language of chemical reaction networks (CRNs), which
are abstract models of molecular processes in well-mixed solutions 1. All CRNs in
this paper are stochastic CRNs, which model processes in which the presence or
absence of very small numbers of certain types of molecules (e.g., a single copy of a
viral genome in a living cell) may be significant. We henceforth omit “stochastic”
from the terminology.
The CRN model, which goes back at least to 1940 [17], has three desirable
features. First, it is mathematically simple. A CRN is a finite collection of reactions,
each of which has a simple form such as A + C
r−→ 2B + C, where the species A,
B, and C, are abstract types of molecules and the rate constant r is a positive real
number representing the “propensity” of an A and a C that encounter one another
to react, thereby being replaced by two Bs and a C in the solution. A species that,
like the species C here, appears on both sides of a reaction is called a catalyst of the
reaction. Catalysts are extremely important in biochemical processes, and they are
extremely useful in our MWT construction. A state of a CRN is a vector specifying
the number of each species present, and the dynamics of the CRN proceed as a
continuous time Markov process with rates derived from the rate constants [1, 2, 3].
1This expository subsection is adapted from [20].
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A second feature of CRNs is that they are very general. Every algorithm can, in
at least one sense, be efficiently simulated by a CRN [53].
A third desirable feature of CRNs, discovered recently, is that they can be
implemented in a uniform way using DNA strand displacement reactions [55]. This
is fortuitous, because dynamic systems in DNA nanotechnology, including DNA
walkers and logic circuits, are typically implemented using DNA strand displacement
reactions [52, 65]. The details of strand displacement reactions are not needed for
this paper, but it is relevant to note that they are relatively easy to implement in the
laboratory, and that they are easy to specify. There is a programming language, DSD,
in which a large, expressive class of such reactions can be specified and compiled
into abstract DNA sequences [50, 36]. CRNs have recently been used as a higher
level programming language that can be compiled into DSD [14, 6].
3.2 Stochastic delay ladders
The timing functions in our Molecular Watchdog Timer are carried out by stochastic
delay ladders (or simply ladders), which are CRNs introduced here having very
predictable behaviors. The simplest type of ladder is a k + 1-rung unary ladder,
which consists of species X0, . . . , Xk and the 2k reactions
Xi
u−→ Xi+1 (0 ≤ i < k),
Xi
r−→ X0 (0 < i ≤ k).
(1)
We call X0, . . . , Xk the rungs, u the upward rate constant, r the reset rate constant,
and k the height of this ladder. The ladder is “unary” because each of its reactions
has only one molecule on its left-hand side. The ladder is initialized with all its
population on the bottom rung, i.e., a positive integer p instances of the species X0
and no instances of Xi for 0 < i ≤ k. Over time, members of this population “try to
climb” the ladder, sometimes going up from one rung to the next and sometimes
falling all the way back to the bottom rung. (This is a CRN implementation of the
“frog in the well” Markov process [3].) The total population p of the ladder remains
fixed throughout these climbing attempts.
Because the ladder (1) is unary, its kinetic behavior is linear. This implies
that a ladder with population p behaves exactly like an aggregate of p statistically
independent ladders with population 1. (Most CRNs have nonlinear behavior and
thus cannot be decomposed into independent, single-molecule nanodevices in this
manner.) Since p is usually large (and often very large), this statistical independence
enables us to predict with high confidence how long it will take (as a function of p,
u, r, and k) for a given fraction of the population to simultaneously occupy the top
rung of the ladder.
In practice, the rate at which reactions occur is governed more by catalysts than
by rate constants. Thus, instead of the unary ladder (1) we introduce catalyzed
ladders of the form
Xi + U
1−→ Xi+1 + U (0 ≤ i < k),
Xi +R
1−→ X0 +R (0 < i ≤ k).
(2)
The kinetics of stochastic CRNs make (2) very similar to (1). For example, if #Xi(t)
is the number of Xi molecules at time t and u(t) is the concentration of U molecules
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at time t (i.e., u(t) = #U(t)/V , where V is the volume of the solution), then at time
t the first reaction in (1) takes place at rate u#Xi(t), while the first reaction in (2)
takes place at rate u(t)#Xi(t). In particular, if u(t) = u and r(t) = r are constant,
then the unary ladder (1) and the catalyzed ladder (2) have identical statistical
behaviors. Moreover, even if u(t) and r(t) fluctuate, but do so independently of the
ladder’s rung populations, the catalyzed ladder (2) enjoys the same decomposability
into independent, population-1 ladders as the unary ladder (1).
When controlling reaction rates by catalysts in the above manner, one often takes
the rate constants to be 1, as we have done in (2). In this case, the rate constants
are omitted from the notation, and assumed to be 1, as we do below.
It is now straightforward to specify the two main components of our Molecular
Watchdog Timer.
3.3 Absence Detector
This component detects when a heartbeat signal has not been present for a specified
period of time. The heartbeat is a “pulse” of a specific molecular species H that
is expected to be periodically output by the molecular application that is being
monitored by the MWT. If the heartbeat is not detected by the MWT for an extended
period of time, we can conclude that the molecular application being monitored has
failed. The Absence Detector is assigned responsibility for achieving the leaf goals
Avoid [Hdet when Heartbeat is not present], Achieve [Hdet when Heartbeat is present],
Achieve [Initialize to Reset], Achieve [Reset if Hdet], Achieve [Threshold Delay if
Reset], and Achieve [Threshold if Hdet is absent] as shown in Figure 2.
The Absence Detector component consists of the catalyzed ladder
Li + U → Li+1 + U (0 ≤ i < k),
Li +H → L0 +H (0 < i ≤ k).
We also write Y for the top rung Lk of this ladder to emphasize its special role as
the upward catalyst for the Threshold Filter below.
3.4 Threshold Filter
This component detects when a target number of individual instances of the Absence
Detector have reached the Lk state. The Threshold Filter trips an alarm if and only
if enough Absence Detectors are in the Lk state to overcome the constant number of
instances of the reset catalyst R of the Threshold Filter. The Threshold Filter is
assigned responsibility for the leaf goals Avoid [Alarm if Reset], Achieve [Alarm if
Threshold for some time], and Avoid [Alarm until first Threshold].
The Threshold Filter consists of the catalyzed ladder
Ti + Y → Ti+1 + Y (0 ≤ i < k),
Ti +R→ T0 +R (0 < i ≤ k).
We also write D for the top rung Tk of the Threshold Filter. This species D is
the alarm species of the MWT. It is used by external modules to trigger a response.
In previous work [20] we described a simple, one-time, Alarm response produced
by amplifying the alarm molecular species. In this paper we will present a more
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powerful response, namely a Recovery component, after introducing a monitored
system in Section 4.2.
4 Design Verification
Formal design analysis provides some assurance that the behavior specified in the
design matches the system’s intended behavior. We must ensure that with very high
probability when there is a heartbeat, the MWT does not alarm, and that with very
high probability when there is no heartbeat, the MWT quickly alarms.
In this section we first describe the analysis and verification techniques used to
verify the design of the MWT and report the verification results. We check that
the MWT works for a very long time in normal conditions (i.e., when the heartbeat
from the monitored system is present) and show via quantitative simulation that
the MWT alarms as quickly as the client needs (indicated via the initial parameter
values) when the heartbeat from the external system disappears.
We then demonstrate the functionality of the MWT by introducing a specific
example of a system that needs to be monitored at runtime and verifying that its
heartbeat behavior is correct. We connect the CRN model of the monitored system to
that of the MWT and verify the correct functioning of the composed system. Finally,
we describe how we extended the existing system to enable the MWT to not only
detect the monitored system’s failure at runtime, i.e., the absence of the expected
heartbeat pulse, but also to trigger the monitored system’s runtime recovery, and
how we verified this additional capability.
4.1 Verifying the MWT design
To check the correctness and robustness of the MWT design, we followed an incre-
mental process of simulation of the CRN model for sanity checks and selection of
likely parameter value ranges, followed by model checking of the CSL leaf goals on
the CRN model across those parameter values. We also injected faults that had been
previously discovered by analytical reasoning to confirm that the model checkers
found them. To recap, the agents to which the leaf subgoals in the goal model are
assigned–the Absence Detector and the Threshold Filter–are described in the CRN
high-level programming language. The properties to be checked against the CRN
model are the CSL formal specification of the leaf goals.
CRN input to verification tools. A strength of CRN as a language for molecu-
lar programming is that a CRN model can be readily imported into MATLAB’s
SimBiology package, allowing simulations to be run on it. We used SimBiology to
understand the behavior and performance of our models and to debug them.
A CRN model can also be used as input into the probabilistic model checker
PRISM [32], used previously to analyze molecular systems, e.g., in [31, 33]. We used
PRISM to verify that the MWT design satisfied the CSL properties derived from
the goal model. The MWT model takes a number of parameters ranging from rate
constants (of DNA reactions) to the length of the absence detector ladders (which
are DNA strands). The parametrized design allowed us to automate testing across
ranges of parameter values for optimization and verification.
Parameters. The values of the client parameters are specified by the client and
depend on the system being monitored. For example, how quickly a heartbeat failure
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must be detected will vary among different applications. Additionally, there are
modeling parameters that were needed to verify the realizability of the specified goals.
An example is the number of each species of molecule represented in a particular
model. The values for these parameters vary as the design space is explored. Their
correct representations emerge from the formal analysis, mathematical proofs that
satisfaction of the subgoals given the environmental assumptions satisfy the root
goal, simulation of the composed system (monitored component and MWT), and the
model checking results. Correct parametrization of the models was time-consuming
and incremental. We used custom MATLAB scripts to generate models of arbitrary
parameters that could integrate with the model checkers. These scripts along with
some features provided by PRISM automated the exploration of the parameter space
to discover models that provably satisfied our requirements.
Reusable MWT. Making the MWT reusable enables the composed system (mon-
itored system and MWT) to recover from faults and then continue execution au-
tonomously, without outside intervention. This is important if the MWT is to be
used in vivo, for example. If the MWT is not reusable, then even if the monitored
system recovers, it is no longer being monitored. The technical difficulty in moving
from a throw-away MWT (one-time use) to a reusable MWT was the creation of a
design for which the initial condition (the set of values for the parameters) could be
restored autonomously. At initialization, we thus configured the MWT to begin with
the majority of rung molecules in the lower rungs of the ladder. When a heartbeat
is detected, the absence detector enters this reset state again. This resets the MWT
for reuse. We validated via simulation in SimBiology that the MWT is reusable
rather than needing to be discarded after a single use. After having alarmed, it is
reset when the monitored system begins issuing heartbeats again.
4.2 Verifying the interaction of the MWT with a monitored system
The question that underlies the verification of the interaction of the MWT with
a monitored system is “Could any such composed molecular system satisfy the
assumptions we make on it and be used productively?” Given current model-
checking limits, we verify the interaction at two very different molecular population
scales, both of which are in realistic ranges of molecular counts.
First we verify using simulation and probabilistic model checking that the in-
teraction of an abstract monitored system with the MWT is correct with respect
to the requirements and show that the assumptions we make on this hypothetical
monitored system are realistic. This first version operates on an abstract signal
received from a hypothetical monitored system. We simulate using SimBiology and
model check using PRISM that the MWT transforms the absence of a heartbeat
signal into an alarm signal correctly. The size for which we can model check it is
small, with molecular counts up to 5. For example, 5 absence detectors produced a
CTMC with over 150,000 states, while 10 absence detectors produced a CTMC with
over 9 million states.
Second, we validate by simulation the correct interaction of an example monitored
system with the MWT and show that the assumptions made on this specific monitored
system are realistic. We first introduce an example of a monitored system and verify
its correctness, using simulation and model checking. This entails verifying that the
presence or absence of its heartbeat is correlated to the monitored system’s health
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or failure. The example monitored system cannot be model checked for all possible
values of its parameters due to the size of the possible space; however, we simulated
it with up to a total species population count of 100,000.
Introducing a system to be monitored. To demonstrate the capabilities of the
MWT design we used it to monitor the health of a standard molecular system, namely
an oscillator. Chemical oscillators occur widely in nature, so are important, and
synthetic molecular oscillators previously have been used as benchmarks in multiple
projects, e.g. [35, 15, 16, 26, 23, 6]. See Section 5 for more information. Another
advantage of selecting the oscillator is that we could readily extend it to output a
heartbeat (to test the normal case) and cause it to cease output of a heartbeat (to
test the failure cases).
We used the Lotka-Volterra 3-Phase Oscillator [12], which employs three species
A, B, and C. Each of the three species corresponds to a single phase of the oscillator.
The oscillator is initialized with the molecular count of one of the three species being
high and the molecular counts of the other two species being low. After initialization,
the oscillator will cycle between the phases following the order A to B to C and then
back to A. As an example, consider the following case. If A is dominating and B
and C have similar molecular counts, then reactions (3) and (5) below are equally
likely to occur. However, when reaction (3) or (5) fires, the rates of all the reactions
change, increasing the rate of reaction (3) and decreasing the rate of reaction (5).
This continues until B is dominating, completing the transition to phase B. A similar
sequence of events occurs for each phase transition.
We extended the CRN model for the stochastic 3-phase oscillator with a heartbeat
interface that produces a heartbeat (H) when the oscillator is healthy. A heartbeat
interface is required in order to use the MWT to monitor the oscillator. The CRN
for the oscillator plus its heartbeat interface is:
A+B
k−→ 2B +H (3)
B + C
k−→ 2C (4)
C +A
k−→ 2A (5)
H
k2−→ ∅ (6)
In order to be useful, the heartbeat interface must cover all possible failure modes.
In a stochastic setting, there are two possible faults in the oscillator that cause it to
fail. First, if any of the three species A, B or C has a molecular count of zero, the
oscillations will stop and the oscillator fail. Second, if the oscillator spends a large
amount of time with all three species near a state of equilibrium, the oscillations
will become negligible and desultory and the oscillator fail. While the oscillator
is working correctly, a large number of H molecules will be created as reaction (3)
occurs. In order for this interface to be correct, it must produce fewer heartbeats
in the case of a fault. For the first fault, if any of the three oscillator species has a
count of zero, all oscillator reactions will quickly have a rate of 0, causing a stop in
the production of heartbeat molecules. For the second fault, if all three oscillator
species are in equilibrium then the H species will fall to a roughly constant amount
low enough to cause the Absence Detector to activate.
Checking correlation of heartbeat with oscillator’s state. In “real-world” scenarios
it is the monitored system’s responsibility to provide a correct heartbeat, meaning
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that the MWT assumes that the heartbeat accurately reflects the normal or failed
state of the monitored system. However, in order to confirm that the MWT operates
correctly and robustly, we had to first confirm that the oscillator outputs a correct
heartbeat. We thus had to check (1) that the oscillator’s health correlates with the
presence (healthy) or absence (unhealthy) of heartbeat molecules at its interface, and
(2) that the MWT’s behavior correlates with the presence or absence of heartbeat
molecules over a period of time at its interface with the monitored system.
A state of the monitored system can be healthy or unhealthy. Informally, in a
healthy state, a heartbeat will be sent within a reasonable time or the state will
quickly become unhealthy. In an unhealthy state, no heartbeat will be sent within a
reasonable time or the state will quickly become healthy. We define a state to be
healthy at time t as A, B, C > 0 AND (A−B)2 + (B − C)2 + (C −A)2 > τ , where
τ is defined to ensure that the oscillator is deemed unhealthy if its species counts
approach equilibrium.
The three properties to be verified are:
Achieve[Produce heartbeats while healthy]
P≥1[(healthy =⇒ P≥1−δ1 [♦≤t1((hbHigh ∨ ¬healthy)])]
Avoid [Produce heartbeats while unhealthy]
P≥1[(¬healthy =⇒
P≥1−δ2 [♦≤t2(P≥1−δ3 [hbLowW (P≥1−δ4 [≤t3healthy])])])]
Heartbeat decays
P≥1[(hbHigh =⇒ P1−δ5 [♦≤t4¬hbHigh])]
We simulated in SimBiology the oscillator and heartbeat interface with a range
of initial counts of A, B, and C up to 1000 (e.g., 80% in A, 10% in B and C) and an
initial count of 0 for H, and checked that these three properties held in the simulations.
The simulations demonstrated that the presence or absence of a heartbeat correlates
with the health of the oscillator in both of the two failure modes. Using a CTMC
model of the oscillator with total population of 200, we then verified in PRISM that
the oscillator plus heartbeat interface satisfied the goals. The model checker verified
true for the three CSL properties above.
Figure 4 shows a simulation of the oscillator for the first failure mode, in which
one of the species counts went to 0. Since no oscillations could occur, heartbeats
ceased to be produced by the oscillator.
4.3 MWT triggers oscillator’s runtime recovery
A system is more robust if it can autonomously recover from a failure. Beyond
detecting and reporting the failure of the monitored system, we also sought to use
the MWT’s Alarm signal to trigger autonomous recovery in a monitored system
after it has failed. To demonstrate this, we constructed a recovery component that,
upon receiving the MWT’s Alarm, will recover the oscillator from either of its failure
modes.
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Figure 4: A simulation of the oscillator with the heartbeat interface.
The CRN for the oscillator’s recovery module is:
D +A
k−→ D +B (7)
D +B
k−→ D + C (8)
D + C
k2−→ D +A, (9)
where the third reaction has a different rate from the other two.
These reactions are triggered by the presence of the MWT Alarm component’s
output signal (the D’s) produced when the MWT detects that the oscillator has
failed. In both the case where the oscillator fails due to running out of the species
A, B, or C, and the case where it fails because it reached an equilibrium state (an
equal number of A’s, B’s and C’s) such that heartbeats stops, these reactions will
recover the oscillator . The recovery “jump-starts” the oscillator and, when the
heartbeat starts up again, the Alarm signal (the D’s) fade away. To check the
correct behavior of the recovery capability, we ran simulations with populations of
100 to 1000 molecules for the oscillator and varying percentages of D molecules. The
MWT’s Alarm signal correctly triggered the oscillator recovery.
Figure 5 shows a single stochastic simulation of the composed system. Initially,
the oscillator works and produces heartbeats. During this time, the absence detected
signal remains low. However, once the oscillator fails and the heartbeats stop, the
absence is quickly detected and the recovery signal is released to trigger the oscillator
to recover. Shortly after the recovery signal is turned on, the oscillator begins normal
operation again.
Generalizing to other applications. Usage of the MWT is intended to be broad.
The MWT is designed to work with any molecular system that needs to be monitored
for the absence of a heartbeat, meaning that it is independent of how the heartbeats
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Figure 5: A simulation of the MWT detecting the oscillator’s failure and triggering
its recovery.
are input to it. The oscillator provides an example of how, given a heartbeat interface
from a client monitored system specified as a rate at which heartbeats are produced
and in what quantity, we can construct a MWT to monitor it. To use our MWT
to monitor a system, the client monitored system (here, the oscillator) describes
what it needs the MWT to do by specifying a polytope, that is a multi-dimensional
space, defined by four parameters. The four client-provided parameters are: u—the
minimum time between a heartbeat and an alarm, v—the maximum time between
a heartbeat and an alarm, ε—the probability of error allowed by the u delay, and
δ—the probability of error in achieving the v delay. For example, a client might
specify that the MWT should allow a minimum of 10 seconds and a maximum of 20
seconds after a heartbeat before an alarm, and it must achieve these time bounds
with probabilities of 95% for both. Thus, u is 10, v is 20, and ε and δ are 5%. The
client also specifies the minimum and maximum size of the heartbeat pulse. If the
client gives us parameter values from within this space, we will provide a design
model for a MWT that satisfies the goal diagram.
There are other, internally generated (rather than client-defined) parameters
that formalize the goal diagram’s constraints. For example, ε is broken into two
internally generated parameters to enable the goal proofs. Thus, in addition to
the four client-provided parameters, there are 22 internally generated parameters
specifying probability and timing constraints. These are listed in the Appendix.
4.4 Mapping to molecules
We have designed and verified our MWT at the CRN level of abstraction, but it is
useful to estimate the feasibility of actually implementing our design in DNA. For
this purpose we used the compiler reported in a very recent paper by Badelt et al. [6].
Using this compiler and its encoding of the translation scheme of Chen et al. [14],
we compiled the CRN for a small MWT and oscillator into DNA strands. The MWT
has a 4-rung Absence Detector ladder and a 5-rung Threshold Detector ladder and
includes the three recovery reactions. As reported in the Appendix, this MWT alone
compiles to 122 distinct DNA strands. The combination of this MWT with the CRN
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for the three-phase oscillator (modified to include heartbeat production) compiles to
147 distinct DNA strands. DNA strand displacement systems of this size are already
feasible for laboratory implementation. For example, Qian and Winfree [51] reported
the successful implementation of a 130-strand DNA displacement device. Larger
MWTs (ones with longer stochastic delay ladders) will be feasible in the near future.
4.5 Discussion
To summarize, the MWT is a programmable, molecular safety mechanism. In the
creation of the design for the MWT, this paper has proposed a new use of software
engineering techniques and tools in a development process that can be applied
more generally to create other molecular systems. The goal-oriented requirements
engineering process described in Sect. 2 systematically develops the requirements for
a molecular programmed system, using continuous stochastic logic (CSL) to specify
the requirements (leaf goals) and to verify the goal refinement with machine-checkable
proofs. The assignment of requirements to the components’ designs responsible for
achieving them is described in Sect. 3. The designs are formally specified as stochastic
chemical reaction networks (CRNs). CRNs recently have become widely used to
specify programmed molecular systems since compilers now exist from CRNs into
lower-level (DNA-strand-level) designs and from there into molecules. Modeling the
designs as CRNs supports both simulation and verification, and both MATLAB’s
SimBiology and the PRISM probabilistic model checker accept CRN input. This
section has described the simulation and verification of the MWT, first as a standalone
device; second, when connected to a device, such as the oscillator, that needs to be
monitored for a failure event; and third, when connected to a device that needs to
be triggered by the MWT to also recover from its failure event at runtime.
5 Related Work
In this section we briefly describe additional related work in molecular design software,
model checking, and molecular oscillators.
Molecular design software. Other design tools for DNA computational devices
exist but operate at a very detailed design level. Two open-source software tools
are CaDNAno [19] and CANDO [28]. They are widely used to design, debug and
optimize the stability and physical properties (torque, flexibility, energy wells) of
2-dimensional and 3-dimensional DNA origami structures, and operate at a much
lower level than our design considerations here.
Model checking. In related work Kwiatkowska and Thachuk described the prob-
abilistic verification of CRNs for biological systems using the probabilistic model
checker PRISM [33]. Their work showed the benefits of probabilistic model checking
for molecular systems and informed our work for the MWT. PRISM interfaces with
Visual DSD, a design tool for DNA strand displacement [36].
For large systems, including molecular ones, there is a disconnect between the size
of the model that can be automatically checked and the system. One of the problems
we face is how to prune the model such that we can do meaningful model checking.
Pavese, Barberman and Uchitel described how to develop partial explorations of a
system model automatically [49]. Their technique has promise for use in molecular
programs that we hope to explore. Since many molecular programs deal with
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extremely large, if not infinite, state spaces, probabilistic model checking on partial
system explorations might provide bounds on the reliability of a molecular system
that is too large to model check.
Stochastic models for systems often have distributions that are empirically de-
termined or only partially known. Moreover, small differences between stochastic
models’ parameter values and their real-world counterparts can change the results
of verification. Meedeniya et al. have used Monte Carlo simulations to generate a
reliability evaluation of a probabilistic model of an antilock brake system with uncer-
tain parameters [42]. Su, Chen, Feng, and Rosenblum recently extended previous
work by Su and Rosenblum [57] on perturbations in model checking parameters in
discrete-time Markov chains to allow model checking on time-bounded CTMCs with
imprecise values for transition rates [56]. Since molecular systems have imprecise
reaction rates, determining the effects of parameter variance on the models is impor-
tant, and the applicability of their approaches to programmed molecular systems
merits investigation.
More broadly, there has been significant recent progress in modeling biological
or chemical systems. Yordanov et al. formalized and encoded DNA computing to
allow use of Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [64]. Fisher, Harel and Henzinger
performed computational modeling of biological systems as reactive systems [24].
Hetherington et al. and Sumner et al. composed an advanced computational model
of a biological system from sub-models describing its different aspects [25, 58]. David
et al. created translators to convert SimBiology models for biological systems into
CTMCs for stochastic model checking or into ODEs for simulation [16].
Molecular oscillators. Hori and Murray, in a recent paper on synthetic biochemical
oscillators, stated that, “The reliable engineering of oscillators is an important
milestone towards robust synthesis of more complex dynamical circuits in synthetic
biology” [26]. Gene regulatory networks, for example, use oscillators, and Fern et al.
recently reported the use of timer circuits to precisely coordinate chemical events
in vitro [23]. 3-phase oscillators seem to have been first reported in [34] and more
recently [12, 13, 35]. The 2-phase Lotka-Volterra oscillator also has been studied in
the context of DNA strand displacement in [55, 35]. Ballarini, Mardare and Mura,
and Ballarini and Guerriero presented analyses of the 3-phase oscillator using PRISM
and described both of the failures modes that our MWT design successfully detects
[9, 8].
6 Conclusion
Monitoring the health of programmed molecular systems at runtime is critically
important. Envisioned applications such as biocompatible diagnostic systems and
smart drug therapy systems will need such monitoring capabilities to operate safely.
Using goal-oriented requirements engineering, machine-checked proofs, reaction
network modeling, stochastic simulation, and probabilistic model checking, we have
designed and verified a Molecular Watchdog Timer that can monitor a molecular
system at runtime, detect when the heartbeat signal from the monitored system
stops, and alarm to trigger its recovery. The MWT is modular, designed to operate
correctly in the probabilistic chemical environment, and robust to failure-prone
components. Using chemical reaction networks as a programming language, we
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have implemented both the MWT and a monitored system (a molecular oscillator)
as chemical reaction networks. We have demonstrated the MWT’s capabilities by
showing that the molecular watchdog timer reliably detects failures of the oscillator
and triggers its recovery at runtime.
Many other programmed molecular systems will be needed and developed in the
future. The MWT is an example of a cybermolecular system, a molecular programmed
system that senses and controls its environment, including other molecular systems.
Cybermolecular systems and bio-compatible computing devices are moving rapidly
from the laboratory to widespread usage in daily life. We hope that our software
engineering-inspired approach to designing and verifying the molecular watchdog
timer can assist in the future design of predictable and safe molecular systems.
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Appendix
A Internal Parameters of the Goals
Here we list the internal parameters generated during the goal refinement.
• 1 and 2 are refinements from  that determine the allowed error in avoiding
Alarms while heartbeats are present.
• wa is a time bound on turning on the alarm.
• α and β are allowed error in detecting the presence of heartbeats.
• wh is the maximum time to detect the presence or absence of a heartbeat.
• ′1 and ′2 are allowed error in avoiding Alarms while a heartbeat is detected.
• g is the time allowed between detecting a heartbeat and keeping the Alarm
off.
• δ′1 is the allowed error in initiating an Alarm when no heartbeat is detected.
• λ1 is the allowed error in Resetting when a heartbeat is detected.
• won is the maximum time to Reset when a heartbeat is detected.
• γ1 is the allowed error in setting the threshold to low when Reset is true.
• η1, η2, and η3 are allowed errors in setting the threshold to high until a heartbeat
is detected from a time when no heartbeat is detected.
• wth is a time bound on how long it takes to set the threshold to high.
• λ2 and λ3 are allowed errors in avoiding Alarms while the threshold is low.
• woff is the maximum time allowed between a low threshold and keeping the
Alarm off.
• η4 is the allowed error in turning the Alarm on after the threshold is high.
• γ2 is the allowed error that the Alarm is off at least until the first time that
the threshold is not low.
B Formal Goal Specification and Agent Assignment
The following table provides a breadth first listing of the goals for the Molecular
Watchdog Timer (MWT) in Figure 2. It lists the goal description, the formal CSL
specification, and, for leaf nodes, the agent assigned responsibility, where AD and
TF represent the Absence Detector and Threshold Filter respectively.
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Goal CSL Specification Agent
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff no
Heartbeat
provided within t
time
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒
P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Alarm)] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Alarm ∨Hpres)]
ACHIEVE:
Heartbeat
Detected
correctly tracks
the presence of
Heartbeats within
t− t′ time
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦≤whHdet] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff no
Heartbeat
detected within t′
time.
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒
P≥1−′1♦≤g
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Alarm
)]
∧
P≥1 [¬Hdet =⇒
P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa (Alarm ∨Hpres)
]
AVOID:
Heartbeat
Detected when
Heartbeat not
present
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒
P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
AD
ACHIEVE:
Heartbeat
Detected when
Heartbeat present
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whHdet] AD
ACHIEVE:
Correct Timer
Reset
Reset ∧
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset]
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Goal CSL Specification Agent
ACHIEVE:
Correct Delay
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] ∧
ThL =⇒ ¬ThH
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2∗wh−wthP≥1−η2
(ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
ACHIEVE:
Alarm iff
Threshold met
P≥1 [ThL =⇒
P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Alarm
] ∧
P≥1 [ThH =⇒
P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)] ∧
P≥1−γ2 (¬AlarmW ¬ThL)
ACHIEVE:
Initialize to Reset
Reset AD
ACHIEVE:
Reset if Hdet
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset] AD
ACHIEVE:
Threshold delay if
Reset
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] AD
ACHIEVE:
Threshold if Hdet
is absent
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒
P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2wh−wthP≥1−η2
(ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
AD
AVOID:
Alarm if Reset
P≥1 [ThL =⇒
P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Alarm
] TF
ACHIEVE:
Alarm if
Threshold for
some time
P≥1 [ThH =⇒
P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)]
TF
AVOID:
Alarm until first
Threshold
P≥1−γ2 (¬AlarmW ¬ThL) TF
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C Verification of Goal Model I: Theorems
In this section and the following section we verify that the satisfaction of a goal can
be fulfilled by the satisfaction of all its subgoals, and hence the entire goal tree is
verified.
C.1 Theorems
The proof of our goal model correctness is broken into the following three main
theorems, and each corresponds to one of the goal refinements in the model. All of
the theorems depend on the following constrains on the internal parameters of the
model.
(1− 1)(1− 2) ≤ (1− β)(1− ′1)
1− 2 ≤ 1− ′2
wh ≤ g
1− δ1 ≤ (1− α)(1− β)(1− δ′1)
1−  ≤ 1− γ1 − γ2
(1− ′1)(1− ′2) ≤ (1− λ1)(1− λ2)(1− λ3)(1− γ1)
g − wh ≥ won + woff
γ1 < 1
1− ′1 ≤ (1− λ1)(1− λ2)
1− ′2 ≤ 1− λ3
1− δ′1 ≤ (1− η1)(1− η2)(1− η3)(1− η4)
Theorem C.1. The children of “ACHIEVE: Alarm iff no HB provided in t time”
imply their parent where the parent specification is:
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧ (10)
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−1♦≤g (P≥1−2≤u¬Alarm)] ∧ (11)
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−δ1♦≤v−wa (Alarm ∨Hpres)] (12)
and the specifications for the children are:
Subgoal 1:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whHdet] ∧ (13)
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)] (14)
Subgoal 2:
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧ (15)
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−′1♦≤g−wh
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Alarm
)]
∧ (16)
P≥1
[
¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa−wh (Alarm ∨Hdet)
]
(17)
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Theorem C.2. The children of “ACHIEVE: Heartbeat Detected correctly tracks
the presence of Heartbeats within t− t′ time” imply their parent where the parent
specification is:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whHdet] ∧
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
and the specifications for the children are:
Subgoal 1:
P≥1 [¬Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦whP≥1−α (¬HdetW Hpres)]
Subgoal 2:
P≥1 [Hpres =⇒ P≥1−β♦≤whHdet]
Theorem C.3. The children of “ACHIEVE: Alarm iff no Heartbeat detected”
imply their parent where the parent specification is:
P≥1−≤u¬Alarm ∧ (18)
P≥1
[
Hdet =⇒ P≥1−′1♦≤g−wh
(
P≥1−′2≤u¬Alarm
)]
∧ (19)
P≥1
[
¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−δ′1♦≤v−wa−wh (Alarm ∨Hdet)
]
(20)
and the specifications for the children are:
Subgoal 1:
Reset ∧ (21)
P≥1 [Hdet =⇒ P≥1−λ1♦≤wonReset] (22)
Subgoal 2:
P≥1 [Reset =⇒ P≥1−γ1≤uThL] ∧ (23)
P≥1[¬Hdet =⇒ P≥1−η1♦v−wa−2wh−wth
P≥1−η2 (ThH W P≥1−η3♦≤whHdet)]
(24)
Subgoal 3:
P≥1
[
ThL =⇒ P≥1−λ2♦≤woffP≥1−λ3≤u¬Alarm
] ∧ (25)
P≥1 [ThH =⇒ P≥1−η4♦≤wth (Alarm ∨ ¬ThH)] ∧ (26)
P≥1−γ2 (¬AlarmW ¬ThL) (27)
Theorem C.4. All parent goals of leaves are implied by their children.
Proof. All leaf goals are broken down by conjunction and trivially imply their
parents.
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C.2 Lemmas
For each of the following lemmas, assume that M is a CTMC and q0 is its start state.
For all lemmas except lemma C.5, we base each implication at an arbitrary state q.
For simplicity, we assume that every state in M is reachable from the start state
and note that any unreachable states can be removed without affecting the behavior
of M .
Lemma C.5.
∀q′ φ(q′)⇐⇒ (P≥1φ)(q0)
Proof. This follows trivially from our assumption that all states are reachable.
Lemma C.6. P≥α♦≤s (φ ∨P≥β♦≤tψ)
∴ P≥αβ♦≤s+t (φ ∨ ψ)
Proof. With probability α at least one of two cases must occur.
Case 1: φ is true within time s.
In this case, φ ∨ ψ is certainly true within s+ t time.
Case 2: P≥β♦≤tψ is true in time s.
In this case, with probability β, M reaches a state q1 satisfying ψ in time t.
Since M reaches a state satisfying P≥β♦≤tψ in time s and ψ satisfies φ ∨ ψ,
then with probability β M reaches a state satisfying φ ∨ ψ in time s+ t.
In either case φ∨ψ must be true in time s+ t with probability greater or equal to β.
Since at least one case must occur with probability α, we have P≥αβ♦s+t(φ∨ψ).
Lemma C.7. P≥α (φ ∧P≥β♦≤s(¬φ ∨ θ)) W ψ
∴ P≥αβ♦≤s(ψ ∨ θ)
Proof. Recall that the statement P≥γφ1 W φ2 is satisfied if, with probability at
least γ, the CTMC M follows a path that satisfies φ1 in every state until it reaches
a state that satisfies φ2. This is a “weak until” operator, so it can be satisfied even
if φ2 is never satisfied, as long as φ1 holds indefinitely.
Note that the claim trivially holds if ψ is true in state q since it will satisfy ψ
within s time with probability 1. If ¬ψ holds in state q, then with probability α,
the formulas φ and P≥β♦≤s(¬φ ∨ θ) hold until ψ holds. In this case, the formula
P≥β♦≤s(¬φ ∨ θ) implies that, with probability β, either ¬φ or θ will eventually
hold within s time. If θ eventually holds, then ♦≤s(ψ ∨ θ) held with probability at
least αβ. If ¬φ eventually holds, then ψ must have been satisfied since φ must hold
until ψ is satisfied. Thus, ♦≤s(ψ ∨ θ) held with probability at least αβ in this case,
also.
Lemma C.8. P≥α≤tθ P≥βφW ¬θ
∴ P≥α+β−1≤tφ
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Proof. Since the two hypotheses may be dependent, the probability that the CTMC
M follows a path that satisfies both ≤tθ and φW ¬θ is lower-bounded by α+β−1.
It is therefore sufficient to prove that any path satisfying both ≤tθ and φW ¬θ
must also satisfy ≤tφ.
Consider an arbitrary path that satisfies both formulas. Because of ≤tθ, the
path cannot reach a state that satisfies ¬θ until after time t. Because of φW ¬θ,
the path must satisfy φ until it satisfies ¬θ. Therefore the path must satisfy φ until
after time t.
Lemma C.9. P>0φ
∴ φ
Proof. If φ is not true in state q, then φ fails with probability 1. Since there is a
strictly positive probability that φ is satisfied, φ must be true initially.
Lemma C.10. P≥α♦≤tφ ∀q′ (φ =⇒ ψ)(q′)
∴ P≥α♦≤tψ
Proof. With probability α, M enters a state q1 satisfying φ within time t. Since
φ =⇒ ψ at all states in M , q1 must also satisfy ψ, and therefore P≥α♦≤tψ.
The following two trivial relaxation lemmas are used and stated without proof.
Lemma C.11.
α ≥ β s ≤ t P≥α♦≤sφ
P≥β♦≤tφ
Lemma C.12.
α ≥ β s ≥ t P≥α≥sφ
P≥β≥tφ
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D Verification of Goal Model II: Isabelle
D.1 Locale and Constraints
theory runtime-fault-detection
imports Complex-Main
begin
locale runtime-fault-detection =
fixes
q0 :: ′a and
Hpres :: ′a ⇒ bool and
Hdet :: ′a ⇒ bool and
Alarm :: ′a ⇒ bool and
α :: real and
β :: real and
ε :: real and
ε1 :: real and
ε1p :: real and
ε2 :: real and
ε2p :: real and
wh :: real and
g :: real and
δ1 :: real and
δ1p :: real and
δ2 :: real and
γ1 :: real and
γ2 :: real and
η1 :: real and
η2 :: real and
η3 :: real and
η4 :: real and
l1 :: real and
l2 :: real and
l3 :: real and
won :: real and
woff :: real and
Pdiam :: real ⇒ real ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool and
Pdiam2 :: real ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool and
Pblock :: real ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool and
Pdur :: real ⇒ real ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool and
PW :: real ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool
assumes
constr1 : (1−ε1 ) ≤ (1−β)∗(1−ε1p) and
constr2 : (1−ε2 ) ≤ (1−ε2p) and
constr3 : wh ≤ g and
constr4 : (1−δ1 ) ≤ (1−α)∗(1−β)∗(1−δ1p) and
constr5 : (1−ε) ≤ (1−γ1−γ2 ) and
constr6 : (1−ε1p)∗(1−ε2p) ≤ (1−l1 )∗(1−γ1 )∗(1−l2 )∗(1−l3 ) and
constr7 : (g−wh) ≥ won + woff and
constr8 : (1−γ1 ) > 0 and
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constr9 : (1−ε1p) ≤ (1−l1 )∗(1−l2 ) and
constr10 : (1−ε2p) ≤ (1−l3 ) and
constr11 : (1−δ1p) ≤ (1−η1 )∗(1−η2 )∗(1−η3 )∗(1−η4 )
begin
D.2 Logical Connectives for CSL Formulae
definition cand :: ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) (infixr c∧ 35 )
where (fa c∧ fb) = (λx . (fa x ) ∧ (fb x ))
definition cor :: ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) (infixr c∨ 30 )
where (fa c∨ fb) = (λx . (fa x ) ∨ (fb x ))
definition cimp :: ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) (infixr c−→ 25 )
where (fa c−→ fb) = (λx . (fa x ) −→ (fb x ))
definition cnot :: ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ( ′a ⇒ bool) ( c¬)
where c¬f = (λx . ¬(f x ))
D.3 Foundational CSL Lemmas
lemma lemma3-5 [iff ]: (Pblock 1 ϕ q0 ) = (∀ q . ϕ q)
sorry
lemma lemma3-6 : (Pdiam a s (ϕ c∨ (Pdiam b t ψ)) q) =⇒ (Pdiam (a∗b) (s+t) (ϕ c∨ ψ)
q)
sorry
lemma lemma3-7 : (PW a (ϕ c∧ (Pdiam b s ((c¬ϕ) c∨ ϑ))) ψ) q =⇒ (Pdiam (a∗b) s (ψ
c∨ ϑ)) q
sorry
lemma lemma3-8 : (Pdur a t ϑ q) =⇒ (PW b ϕ (c¬ϑ) q) =⇒ (Pdur (a+b−1 ) t ϕ q)
sorry
lemma lemma3-9 : a > 0 =⇒ Pdur a t ϕ q =⇒ ϕ q
sorry
lemma lemma3-10 : Pdiam a t ϕ q =⇒ (∀ qp. (ϕ c−→ ψ) qp) =⇒ Pdiam a t ψ q
sorry
D.4 Relaxation Lemmas
lemma lemma3-11 : (a ≥ b) =⇒ (s ≤ t) =⇒ (Pdiam a s ϕ q) =⇒ (Pdiam b t ϕ q)
sorry
lemma lemma3-12 : (a ≥ b) =⇒ (s ≥ t) =⇒ (Pdur a s ϕ q) =⇒ (Pdur b t ϕ q)
sorry
D.5 Additional Lemmas
lemma andapplication:
fixes f :: ( ′a ⇒ bool) ⇒ ′a ⇒ bool
assumes asm1 : f ϕ q
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assumes asm2 : Pblock 1 ψ q0
shows f (ϕ c∧ ψ) q (is f ?andterm q)
proof −
have ψ q using lemma3-5 asm2 by auto
then have (ϕ c∧ ψ) = (λx . ϕ x ∧ True) using asm2 cand-def lemma3-5 by simp
then show ?thesis using asm1 by auto
qed
lemma diamcombine: Pdiam a s (Pdiam b t ϕ) q =⇒ Pdiam (a ∗ b) (s + t) ϕ q
using lemma3-6 [of a s λx . False b t ϕ q ] cor-def by simp
lemma andimplies: (fa c∧ (fa c−→ fb)) = (fa c∧ fb) (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof −
have ?lhs = (λx . (fa x ) ∧ (fa x −→ fb x )) by (simp add : cand-def cimp-def )
then have ?lhs = (λx . (fa x ) ∧ (fb x )) by auto
then show ?lhs = (fa c∧ fb) by (simp add : cand-def )
qed
lemma notnot [simp]: (c¬(c¬ϕ)) = ϕ
using cnot-def by auto
lemma orcomm[iff ]: (fa c∨ fb) = (fb c∨ fa)
using cor-def by auto
lemma andcomm[iff ]: (fa c∧ fb) = (fb c∧ fa)
using cand-def by auto
lemma imptrans[simp]: (fa c−→ fb) q =⇒ (fb c−→ fc) q =⇒ (fa c−→ fc) q
using cimp-def by auto
D.6 Goal Diagram Implications
D.6.1 Theorem 3.1
lemma t3dot1 :
assumes eq4 : Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh Hdet)) q0
assumes eq5 : Pblock 1 (c¬Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh (PW (1−α) (c¬Hdet) Hpres)))
q0
assumes eq6 : Pdur (1−ε) u (c¬Alarm) q0
assumes eq7 : Pblock 1 (Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−ε1p) (g − wh) (Pdur (1−ε2p) u
(c¬Alarm)))) q0 (is Pblock 1 ?eq7 q0 )
assumes eq8 : Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v − wa − wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)))
q0
shows ((Pdur (1−ε) u (c¬Alarm)) c∧
(Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−ε1 ) g (Pdur (1−ε2 ) u (c¬Alarm))))) c∧
(Pblock 1 (c¬Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−δ1 ) (v − wa) (Alarm c∨ Hpres))))) q0 (is (?goal1
c∧ ?goal2 c∧ ?goal3 ) q0 )
proof −
have goal1 : ?goal1 q0 using eq6 by blast
have Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh (Pdiam (1−ε1p) (g−wh) (Pdur (1−ε2p)
u (c¬Alarm))))) q0
using cimp-def lemma3-10 eq4 eq7 by auto
then have Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam ((1−β)∗(1−ε1p)) g (Pdur (1−ε2p) u (c¬Alarm))))
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q0
using diamcombine lemma3-5 cimp-def imptrans by fastforce
then have goal2 : ?goal2 q0 using constr1 constr2 lemma3-11 lemma3-12 lemma3-10 by
(smt lemma3-5 cimp-def imptrans)
have Pblock 1 ((c¬Hpres) c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh (PW (1−α) ((c¬Hdet) c∧ (c¬Hdet
c−→ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)))) Hpres))) q0
(is ?f (c¬Hdet c∧ (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)))) q0 )
using eq5 eq8 andapplication[of ?f c¬Hdet q0 ] by blast
then have step1 : ?f (c¬Hdet c∧ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet))) q0
(is Pblock 1 (c¬Hpres c−→ ?i1 ) q0 )
using andimplies[of c¬Hdet Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)] by metis
have ∀ q . ((PW (1−α) (c¬Hdet c∧ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)))
Hpres) c−→
(Pdiam ((1−α)∗(1−δ1p)) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hpres))) q
using lemma3-7 [of 1−α c¬Hdet 1−δ1p v−wa−wh Alarm Hpres ] cimp-def diff-add-eq-diff-diff-swap
diff-diff-add notnot orcomm by auto
then have ∀ q . ((Pdiam (1−β) wh (PW (1−α) (c¬Hdet c∧ (Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v−wa−wh)
(Alarm c∨ Hdet))) Hpres)) c−→
(Pdiam (1−β) wh (Pdiam ((1−α)∗(1−δ1p)) (v−wa−wh) (Alarm c∨ Hpres)))) q
(is ∀ q . ((Pdiam (1−β) wh ?fa) c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh ?fb)) q is ∀ q . (?left c−→
?middle)q)
using lemma3-10 [of 1−β wh ?fa - ?fb] cimp-def by auto
moreover have ∀ q . (?middle c−→ (Pdiam (1−δ1 ) (v−wa) (Alarm c∨ Hpres))) q (is
∀ q . (?middle c−→ ?right) q)
using diamcombine cimp-def mult .assoc lemma3-11 by (smt Groups.mult-ac(2 ) add .commute
constr4 diff-add-cancel)
ultimately have ∀ q . (?left c−→ ?right) q
by (meson diff-diff-add imptrans mult .commute mult .left-commute)
then have ∀ q . (c¬Hpres c−→ ?right) q using step1 lemma3-5 by (metis imptrans)
then have goal3 : ?goal3 q0 using constr4 lemma3-5 by blast
show ?thesis using goal1 goal2 goal3 cand-def by auto
qed
D.6.2 Theorem 3.2
lemma t3dot2 :
assumes eqa: Pblock 1 (c¬Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh (PW (1−α) (c¬Hdet) Hpres)))
q0
assumes eqb: Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh Hdet)) q0
shows ((Pblock 1 (c¬Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh (PW (1−α) (c¬Hdet) Hpres)))) c∧
(Pblock 1 (Hpres c−→ (Pdiam (1−β) wh Hdet)))) q0
proof −
show ?thesis using eqa eqb cand-def by auto
qed
D.6.3 Theorem 3.3
lemma t3dot3 :
assumes eq12 : Reset q0
assumes eq13 : Pblock 1 (Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−l1 ) won Reset)) q0 (is Pblock 1 ?eq13
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q0 )
assumes eq14 : Pblock 1 (Reset c−→ (Pdur (1−γ1 ) u ThL)) q0 (is Pblock 1 ?eq14 q0 )
assumes eq15 : Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−η1 ) (v − wa − 2∗wh − wth) (PW
(1−η2 ) ThH (Pdiam (1−η3 ) wh Hdet)))) q0 (is Pblock 1 ?eq15 q0 )
assumes eq16 : Pblock 1 (ThL c−→ (Pdiam (1−l2 ) woff (Pdur (1−l3 ) u (c¬Alarm))))
q0 (is Pblock 1 ?eq16 q0 )
assumes eq17 : Pblock 1 (ThH c−→ (Pdiam (1−η4 ) wth (Alarm c∨ c¬ThH ))) q0 (is
Pblock 1 ?eq17 q0 )
assumes eq18 : PW (1−γ2 ) (c¬Alarm) (c¬ThL) q0
shows ((Pdur (1−ε) u (c¬Alarm)) c∧
(Pblock 1 (Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−ε1p) (g − wh) (Pdur (1−ε2p) u (c¬Alarm))))) c∧
(Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ Pdiam (1−δ1p) (v − wa − wh) (Alarm c∨ Hdet)))) q0 (is
(?goal1 c∧ ?goal2 c∧ ?goal3 ) q0 )
proof −
have Pdur (1−γ1 ) u ThL q0 using cimp-def eq12 eq14 by simp
then have Pdur (1−γ1−γ2 ) u (c¬Alarm) q0
using eq18 lemma3-8 by (smt add .commute add-diff-cancel-left add-diff-cancel-right
diff-add-cancel)
then have goal1 : ?goal1 q0 using lemma3-12 constr5 by blast
have Pblock 1 (Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−l1 ) won ThL)) q0
using lemma3-9 lemma3-10 constr8 lemma3-5 cimp-def eq13 eq14 imptrans by smt
then have Pblock 1 (Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−l1 ) won (Pdiam (1−l2 ) woff (Pdur (1−l3 )
u (c¬Alarm))))) q0
using andapplication eq16 lemma3-10 lemma3-5 cimp-def by smt
moreover have ∀ q . ((Pdiam (1−l1 ) won (Pdiam (1−l2 ) woff (Pdur (1−l3 ) u (c¬Alarm))))
c−→
(Pdiam (1−ε1p) (g−wh) (Pdur (1−ε2p) u (c¬Alarm)))) q
using diamcombine lemma3-11 lemma3-12 constr7 constr9 constr10 cimp-def lemma3-10
by smt
ultimately have goal2 : ?goal2 q0 using lemma3-5 cimp-def by simp
have Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−η1 ) (v−wa−2∗wh−wth) (PW (1−η2 ) (ThH
c∧
(ThH c−→ (Pdiam (1−η4 ) wth (Alarm c∨ c¬ThH )))) (Pdiam (1−η3 ) wh Hdet)))) q0
(is ?f (ThH c∧ (ThH c−→ (Pdiam (1−η4 ) wth (Alarm c∨ c¬ThH )))) q0 )
using eq15 eq17 andapplication[of ?f ThH q0 ] by blast
then have step1 : ?f (ThH c∧ (Pdiam (1−η4 ) wth (Alarm c∨ c¬ThH ))) q0
(is Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−η1 ) (v−wa−2∗wh−wth) ?ph)) q0 )
using andimplies by metis
then have Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam (1−η1 ) (v−wa−2∗wh−wth)
(Pdiam ((1−η2 )∗(1−η4 )) wth (Alarm c∨ (Pdiam (1−η3 ) wh Hdet))))) q0
using lemma3-7 lemma3-10 cimp-def by (smt lemma3-5 orcomm)
then have Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ (Pdiam ((1−η1 )∗(1−η2 )∗(1−η4 )) (v−wa−2∗wh)
(Alarm c∨ Pdiam (1−η3 ) wh Hdet))) q0
using diamcombine cimp-def by (smt lemma3-5 imptrans mult .assoc orcomm)
then have Pblock 1 (c¬Hdet c−→ Pdiam ((1−η1 )∗(1−η2 )∗(1−η3 )∗(1−η4 )) (v−wa−wh)
(Alarm c∨ Hdet)) q0
using lemma3-6 [of (1−η1 )∗(1−η2 )∗(1−η4 ) v−wa−2∗wh Alarm 1−η3 wh Hdet ]
cimp-def
by (smt lemma3-5 imptrans mult .assoc mult .commute)
then have goal3 : ?goal3 q0 using constr11 lemma3-11 cimp-def lemma3-5 by fastforce
show ?thesis using goal1 goal2 goal3 cand-def by auto
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qed
end
end
E Mapping to molecules
(* File autogenerated by nuskell.
- Translation Scheme: nuskell/schemes/literature/chen2013_2D_JF.ts
- Input CRN:
L1 + U -> L2 + U
L2 + U -> L3 + U
L3 + U -> Y + U
L1 + H -> L1 + H
L2 + H -> L1 + H
L3 + H -> L1 + H
Y + H -> L1 + H
T1 + Y -> T2 + Y
T2 + Y -> T3 + Y
T3 + Y -> T4 + Y
T4 + Y -> D + Y
T1 + R -> T1 + R
T2 + R -> T1 + R
T3 + R -> T1 + R
T4 + R -> T1 + R
D + R -> T1 + R
A + D -> B + D
B + D -> C + D
C + D -> A + D
*)
def Fuel = 20
def Signal = 5
( Signal * < t0^ d1 > (* A *)
| Signal * < t2^ d3 > (* B *)
| Signal * < t4^ d5 > (* C *)
| Signal * < t6^ d7 > (* D *)
| Signal * < t8^ d9 > (* H *)
| Signal * < t10^ d11 > (* L1 *)
| Signal * < t12^ d13 > (* L2 *)
| Signal * < t14^ d15 > (* L3 *)
| Signal * < t16^ d17 > (* R *)
| Signal * < t18^ d19 > (* T1 *)
| Signal * < t20^ d21 > (* T2 *)
| Signal * < t22^ d23 > (* T3 *)
| Signal * < t24^ d25 > (* T4 *)
| Signal * < t26^ d27 > (* U *)
| Signal * < t28^ d29 > (* Y *)
| constant Fuel * < d57 t8^ > (* f0 *)
| constant Fuel * < d9 t10^ > (* f1 *)
| constant Fuel * < t58^ d59 > (* f10 *)
| constant Fuel * < t46^ d47 > (* f100 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d49 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t46^ d47 ]:{ t48^* } (* f101 *)
| constant Fuel * < d53 t8^ > (* f102 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t50^ > (* f103 *)
| constant Fuel * { t14^* }[ d15 t8^ ]:[ d9 t50^ ]:[ d51 t52^ ] (* f104 *)
| constant Fuel * < t50^ d51 > (* f105 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d53 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t50^ d51 ]:{ t52^* } (* f106 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d61 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t20^ d21 ]:[ t58^ d59 ]:{ t60^* } (* f11 *)
| constant Fuel * < d65 t28^ > (* f12 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t22^ > (* f13 *)
| constant Fuel * < d23 t62^ > (* f14 *)
| constant Fuel * { t20^* }[ d21 t28^ ]:[ d29 t62^ ]:[ d63 t64^ ] (* f15 *)
| constant Fuel * < t62^ d63 > (* f16 *)
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| constant Fuel * [ d65 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t22^ d23 ]:[ t62^ d63 ]:{ t64^* } (* f17 *)
| constant Fuel * < d69 t28^ > (* f18 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t24^ > (* f19 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t54^ > (* f2 *)
| constant Fuel * < d25 t66^ > (* f20 *)
| constant Fuel * { t22^* }[ d23 t28^ ]:[ d29 t66^ ]:[ d67 t68^ ] (* f21 *)
| constant Fuel * < t66^ d67 > (* f22 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d69 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t24^ d25 ]:[ t66^ d67 ]:{ t68^* } (* f23 *)
| constant Fuel * < d73 t28^ > (* f24 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t6^ > (* f25 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t70^ > (* f26 *)
| constant Fuel * { t24^* }[ d25 t28^ ]:[ d29 t70^ ]:[ d71 t72^ ] (* f27 *)
| constant Fuel * < t70^ d71 > (* f28 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d73 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t70^ d71 ]:{ t72^* } (* f29 *)
| constant Fuel * { t28^* }[ d29 t8^ ]:[ d9 t54^ ]:[ d55 t56^ ] (* f3 *)
| constant Fuel * < d77 t16^ > (* f30 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t74^ > (* f31 *)
| constant Fuel * { t18^* }[ d19 t16^ ]:[ d17 t74^ ]:[ d75 t76^ ] (* f32 *)
| constant Fuel * < t74^ d75 > (* f33 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d77 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t74^ d75 ]:{ t76^* } (* f34 *)
| constant Fuel * < d81 t16^ > (* f35 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t78^ > (* f36 *)
| constant Fuel * { t20^* }[ d21 t16^ ]:[ d17 t78^ ]:[ d79 t80^ ] (* f37 *)
| constant Fuel * < t78^ d79 > (* f38 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d81 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t78^ d79 ]:{ t80^* } (* f39 *)
| constant Fuel * < t54^ d55 > (* f4 *)
| constant Fuel * < d85 t16^ > (* f40 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t82^ > (* f41 *)
| constant Fuel * { t22^* }[ d23 t16^ ]:[ d17 t82^ ]:[ d83 t84^ ] (* f42 *)
| constant Fuel * < t82^ d83 > (* f43 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d85 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t82^ d83 ]:{ t84^* } (* f44 *)
| constant Fuel * < d89 t16^ > (* f45 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t86^ > (* f46 *)
| constant Fuel * { t24^* }[ d25 t16^ ]:[ d17 t86^ ]:[ d87 t88^ ] (* f47 *)
| constant Fuel * < t86^ d87 > (* f48 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d89 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t86^ d87 ]:{ t88^* } (* f49 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d57 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t54^ d55 ]:{ t56^* } (* f5 *)
| constant Fuel * < d93 t16^ > (* f50 *)
| constant Fuel * < d17 t18^ > (* f51 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t90^ > (* f52 *)
| constant Fuel * < d33 t26^ > (* f53 *)
| constant Fuel * { t6^* }[ d7 t16^ ]:[ d17 t90^ ]:[ d91 t92^ ] (* f54 *)
| constant Fuel * < t90^ d91 > (* f55 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d93 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t90^ d91 ]:{ t92^* } (* f56 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t12^ > (* f57 *)
| constant Fuel * < d97 t6^ > (* f58 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t2^ > (* f59 *)
| constant Fuel * < d61 t28^ > (* f6 *)
| constant Fuel * < d3 t94^ > (* f60 *)
| constant Fuel * { t0^* }[ d1 t6^ ]:[ d7 t94^ ]:[ d95 t96^ ] (* f61 *)
| constant Fuel * < t94^ d95 > (* f62 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d97 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t2^ d3 ]:[ t94^ d95 ]:{ t96^* } (* f63 *)
| constant Fuel * < d13 t30^ > (* f64 *)
| constant Fuel * < d101 t6^ > (* f65 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t4^ > (* f66 *)
| constant Fuel * < d5 t98^ > (* f67 *)
| constant Fuel * { t2^* }[ d3 t6^ ]:[ d7 t98^ ]:[ d99 t100^ ] (* f68 *)
| constant Fuel * < t98^ d99 > (* f69 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t20^ > (* f7 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d101 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t4^ d5 ]:[ t98^ d99 ]:{ t100^* } (* f70 *)
| constant Fuel * { t10^* }[ d11 t26^ ]:[ d27 t30^ ]:[ d31 t32^ ] (* f71 *)
| constant Fuel * < d105 t6^ > (* f72 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t0^ > (* f73 *)
| constant Fuel * < d1 t102^ > (* f74 *)
| constant Fuel * { t4^* }[ d5 t6^ ]:[ d7 t102^ ]:[ d103 t104^ ] (* f75 *)
| constant Fuel * < t30^ d31 > (* f76 *)
| constant Fuel * < t102^ d103 > (* f77 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d105 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t0^ d1 ]:[ t102^ d103 ]:{ t104^* } (* f78 *)
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| constant Fuel * [ d33 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t12^ d13 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:{ t32^* } (* f79 *)
| constant Fuel * < d21 t58^ > (* f8 *)
| constant Fuel * < d37 t26^ > (* f80 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t14^ > (* f81 *)
| constant Fuel * < d15 t34^ > (* f82 *)
| constant Fuel * { t12^* }[ d13 t26^ ]:[ d27 t34^ ]:[ d35 t36^ ] (* f83 *)
| constant Fuel * < t34^ d35 > (* f84 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d37 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t14^ d15 ]:[ t34^ d35 ]:{ t36^* } (* f85 *)
| constant Fuel * < d41 t26^ > (* f86 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t28^ > (* f87 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t38^ > (* f88 *)
| constant Fuel * { t14^* }[ d15 t26^ ]:[ d27 t38^ ]:[ d39 t40^ ] (* f89 *)
| constant Fuel * { t18^* }[ d19 t28^ ]:[ d29 t58^ ]:[ d59 t60^ ] (* f9 *)
| constant Fuel * < t38^ d39 > (* f90 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d41 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t38^ d39 ]:{ t40^* } (* f91 *)
| constant Fuel * < d45 t8^ > (* f92 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t42^ > (* f93 *)
| constant Fuel * { t10^* }[ d11 t8^ ]:[ d9 t42^ ]:[ d43 t44^ ] (* f94 *)
| constant Fuel * < t42^ d43 > (* f95 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d45 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t42^ d43 ]:{ t44^* } (* f96 *)
| constant Fuel * < d49 t8^ > (* f97 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t46^ > (* f98 *)
| constant Fuel * { t12^* }[ d13 t8^ ]:[ d9 t46^ ]:[ d47 t48^ ] (* f99 *)
)
(* File autogenerated by nuskell.
- Translation Scheme: nuskell/schemes/literature/chen2013_2D_JF.ts
- Input CRN:
L1 + U -> L2 + U
L2 + U -> L3 + U
L3 + U -> Y + U
L1 + H -> L1 + H
L2 + H -> L1 + H
L3 + H -> L1 + H
Y + H -> L1 + H
T1 + Y -> T2 + Y
T2 + Y -> T3 + Y
T3 + Y -> T4 + Y
T4 + Y -> D + Y
T1 + R -> T1 + R
T2 + R -> T1 + R
T3 + R -> T1 + R
T4 + R -> T1 + R
D + R -> T1 + R
A + B -> B + B + H
B + C -> C + C
C + A -> A + A
A + D -> B + D
B + D -> C + D
C + D -> A + D
H -> W
*)
def Fuel = 20
def Signal = 5
( Signal * < t0^ d1 > (* A *)
| Signal * < t2^ d3 > (* B *)
| Signal * < t4^ d5 > (* C *)
| Signal * < t6^ d7 > (* D *)
| Signal * < t8^ d9 > (* H *)
| Signal * < t10^ d11 > (* L1 *)
| Signal * < t12^ d13 > (* L2 *)
| Signal * < t14^ d15 > (* L3 *)
| Signal * < t16^ d17 > (* R *)
| Signal * < t18^ d19 > (* T1 *)
| Signal * < t20^ d21 > (* T2 *)
| Signal * < t22^ d23 > (* T3 *)
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| Signal * < t24^ d25 > (* T4 *)
| Signal * < t26^ d27 > (* U *)
| Signal * < t28^ d29 > (* W *)
| Signal * < t30^ d31 > (* Y *)
| constant Fuel * < d59 t8^ > (* f0 *)
| constant Fuel * < d9 t10^ > (* f1 *)
| constant Fuel * < t60^ d61 > (* f10 *)
| constant Fuel * < d29 t120^ > (* f100 *)
| constant Fuel * { t8^* }[ d9 t120^ ]:[ d121 t122^ ] (* f101 *)
| constant Fuel * < t120^ d121 > (* f102 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d123 ]:[ t28^ d29 ]:[ t120^ d121 ]:{ t122^* } (* f103 *)
| constant Fuel * < d39 t26^ > (* f104 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t14^ > (* f105 *)
| constant Fuel * < d15 t36^ > (* f106 *)
| constant Fuel * { t12^* }[ d13 t26^ ]:[ d27 t36^ ]:[ d37 t38^ ] (* f107 *)
| constant Fuel * < t36^ d37 > (* f108 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d39 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t14^ d15 ]:[ t36^ d37 ]:{ t38^* } (* f109 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d63 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:[ t20^ d21 ]:[ t60^ d61 ]:{ t62^* } (* f11 *)
| constant Fuel * < d43 t26^ > (* f110 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t30^ > (* f111 *)
| constant Fuel * < d31 t40^ > (* f112 *)
| constant Fuel * { t14^* }[ d15 t26^ ]:[ d27 t40^ ]:[ d41 t42^ ] (* f113 *)
| constant Fuel * < t40^ d41 > (* f114 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d43 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:[ t40^ d41 ]:{ t42^* } (* f115 *)
| constant Fuel * < d47 t8^ > (* f116 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t44^ > (* f117 *)
| constant Fuel * { t10^* }[ d11 t8^ ]:[ d9 t44^ ]:[ d45 t46^ ] (* f118 *)
| constant Fuel * < t44^ d45 > (* f119 *)
| constant Fuel * < d67 t30^ > (* f12 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d47 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t44^ d45 ]:{ t46^* } (* f120 *)
| constant Fuel * < d51 t8^ > (* f121 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t48^ > (* f122 *)
| constant Fuel * { t12^* }[ d13 t8^ ]:[ d9 t48^ ]:[ d49 t50^ ] (* f123 *)
| constant Fuel * < t48^ d49 > (* f124 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d51 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t48^ d49 ]:{ t50^* } (* f125 *)
| constant Fuel * < d55 t8^ > (* f126 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t52^ > (* f127 *)
| constant Fuel * { t14^* }[ d15 t8^ ]:[ d9 t52^ ]:[ d53 t54^ ] (* f128 *)
| constant Fuel * < t52^ d53 > (* f129 *)
| constant Fuel * < d31 t22^ > (* f13 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d55 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t52^ d53 ]:{ t54^* } (* f130 *)
| constant Fuel * < d23 t64^ > (* f14 *)
| constant Fuel * { t20^* }[ d21 t30^ ]:[ d31 t64^ ]:[ d65 t66^ ] (* f15 *)
| constant Fuel * < t64^ d65 > (* f16 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d67 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:[ t22^ d23 ]:[ t64^ d65 ]:{ t66^* } (* f17 *)
| constant Fuel * < d71 t30^ > (* f18 *)
| constant Fuel * < d31 t24^ > (* f19 *)
| constant Fuel * < d11 t56^ > (* f2 *)
| constant Fuel * < d25 t68^ > (* f20 *)
| constant Fuel * { t22^* }[ d23 t30^ ]:[ d31 t68^ ]:[ d69 t70^ ] (* f21 *)
| constant Fuel * < t68^ d69 > (* f22 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d71 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:[ t24^ d25 ]:[ t68^ d69 ]:{ t70^* } (* f23 *)
| constant Fuel * < d75 t30^ > (* f24 *)
| constant Fuel * < d31 t6^ > (* f25 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t72^ > (* f26 *)
| constant Fuel * { t24^* }[ d25 t30^ ]:[ d31 t72^ ]:[ d73 t74^ ] (* f27 *)
| constant Fuel * < t72^ d73 > (* f28 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d75 ]:[ t30^ d31 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t72^ d73 ]:{ t74^* } (* f29 *)
| constant Fuel * { t30^* }[ d31 t8^ ]:[ d9 t56^ ]:[ d57 t58^ ] (* f3 *)
| constant Fuel * < d79 t16^ > (* f30 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t76^ > (* f31 *)
| constant Fuel * { t18^* }[ d19 t16^ ]:[ d17 t76^ ]:[ d77 t78^ ] (* f32 *)
| constant Fuel * < t76^ d77 > (* f33 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d79 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t76^ d77 ]:{ t78^* } (* f34 *)
| constant Fuel * < d83 t16^ > (* f35 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t80^ > (* f36 *)
| constant Fuel * { t20^* }[ d21 t16^ ]:[ d17 t80^ ]:[ d81 t82^ ] (* f37 *)
| constant Fuel * < t80^ d81 > (* f38 *)
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| constant Fuel * [ d83 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t80^ d81 ]:{ t82^* } (* f39 *)
| constant Fuel * < t56^ d57 > (* f4 *)
| constant Fuel * < d87 t16^ > (* f40 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t84^ > (* f41 *)
| constant Fuel * { t22^* }[ d23 t16^ ]:[ d17 t84^ ]:[ d85 t86^ ] (* f42 *)
| constant Fuel * < t84^ d85 > (* f43 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d87 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t84^ d85 ]:{ t86^* } (* f44 *)
| constant Fuel * < d91 t16^ > (* f45 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t88^ > (* f46 *)
| constant Fuel * { t24^* }[ d25 t16^ ]:[ d17 t88^ ]:[ d89 t90^ ] (* f47 *)
| constant Fuel * < t88^ d89 > (* f48 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d91 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t88^ d89 ]:{ t90^* } (* f49 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d59 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t10^ d11 ]:[ t56^ d57 ]:{ t58^* } (* f5 *)
| constant Fuel * < d95 t16^ > (* f50 *)
| constant Fuel * < d17 t18^ > (* f51 *)
| constant Fuel * < d19 t92^ > (* f52 *)
| constant Fuel * { t6^* }[ d7 t16^ ]:[ d17 t92^ ]:[ d93 t94^ ] (* f53 *)
| constant Fuel * < t92^ d93 > (* f54 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d95 ]:[ t16^ d17 ]:[ t18^ d19 ]:[ t92^ d93 ]:{ t94^* } (* f55 *)
| constant Fuel * < d35 t26^ > (* f56 *)
| constant Fuel * < d99 t8^ > (* f57 *)
| constant Fuel * < d9 t2^ > (* f58 *)
| constant Fuel * < d3 t2^ > (* f59 *)
| constant Fuel * < d63 t30^ > (* f6 *)
| constant Fuel * < d3 t96^ > (* f60 *)
| constant Fuel * { t0^* }[ d1 t2^ ]:[ d3 t96^ ]:[ d97 t98^ ] (* f61 *)
| constant Fuel * < t96^ d97 > (* f62 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d99 ]:[ t8^ d9 ]:[ t2^ d3 ]:[ t2^ d3 ]:[ t96^ d97 ]:{ t98^* } (* f63 *)
| constant Fuel * < d27 t12^ > (* f64 *)
| constant Fuel * < d103 t4^ > (* f65 *)
| constant Fuel * < d5 t4^ > (* f66 *)
| constant Fuel * < d5 t100^ > (* f67 *)
| constant Fuel * < d13 t32^ > (* f68 *)
| constant Fuel * { t2^* }[ d3 t4^ ]:[ d5 t100^ ]:[ d101 t102^ ] (* f69 *)
| constant Fuel * < d31 t20^ > (* f7 *)
| constant Fuel * < t100^ d101 > (* f70 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d103 ]:[ t4^ d5 ]:[ t4^ d5 ]:[ t100^ d101 ]:{ t102^* } (* f71 *)
| constant Fuel * { t10^* }[ d11 t26^ ]:[ d27 t32^ ]:[ d33 t34^ ] (* f72 *)
| constant Fuel * < d107 t0^ > (* f73 *)
| constant Fuel * < d1 t0^ > (* f74 *)
| constant Fuel * < d1 t104^ > (* f75 *)
| constant Fuel * { t4^* }[ d5 t0^ ]:[ d1 t104^ ]:[ d105 t106^ ] (* f76 *)
| constant Fuel * < t104^ d105 > (* f77 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d107 ]:[ t0^ d1 ]:[ t0^ d1 ]:[ t104^ d105 ]:{ t106^* } (* f78 *)
| constant Fuel * < t32^ d33 > (* f79 *)
| constant Fuel * < d21 t60^ > (* f8 *)
| constant Fuel * < d111 t6^ > (* f80 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t2^ > (* f81 *)
| constant Fuel * < d3 t108^ > (* f82 *)
| constant Fuel * { t0^* }[ d1 t6^ ]:[ d7 t108^ ]:[ d109 t110^ ] (* f83 *)
| constant Fuel * < t108^ d109 > (* f84 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d111 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t2^ d3 ]:[ t108^ d109 ]:{ t110^* } (* f85 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d35 ]:[ t26^ d27 ]:[ t12^ d13 ]:[ t32^ d33 ]:{ t34^* } (* f86 *)
| constant Fuel * < d115 t6^ > (* f87 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t4^ > (* f88 *)
| constant Fuel * < d5 t112^ > (* f89 *)
| constant Fuel * { t18^* }[ d19 t30^ ]:[ d31 t60^ ]:[ d61 t62^ ] (* f9 *)
| constant Fuel * { t2^* }[ d3 t6^ ]:[ d7 t112^ ]:[ d113 t114^ ] (* f90 *)
| constant Fuel * < t112^ d113 > (* f91 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d115 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t4^ d5 ]:[ t112^ d113 ]:{ t114^* } (* f92 *)
| constant Fuel * < d119 t6^ > (* f93 *)
| constant Fuel * < d7 t0^ > (* f94 *)
| constant Fuel * < d1 t116^ > (* f95 *)
| constant Fuel * { t4^* }[ d5 t6^ ]:[ d7 t116^ ]:[ d117 t118^ ] (* f96 *)
| constant Fuel * < t116^ d117 > (* f97 *)
| constant Fuel * [ d119 ]:[ t6^ d7 ]:[ t0^ d1 ]:[ t116^ d117 ]:{ t118^* } (* f98 *)
| constant Fuel * < d123 t28^ > (* f99 *)
)
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